OK guys, I'm back but only briefly. Momentarily I'm leaving for WACcon. WOO HOO WACCON!
@santosh, I must say that I appreciate your careful presentation of my argument in my absence. Such civility is all too rare in these parts and does not go unnoticed.
I thus confess to feeling a little bad in resuming trying to pull apart your position, but since I continue to see problems with it, I trust you'll understand my expressing those concerns.
First of all, I am left in some confusion as to just what it is that we are modeling. The past needs no modeling, because it is actually known. Of course, we can try to come up with concise descriptions of what happened in the past, and perhaps that's what you're referring to.
The problem is, despite your saying that you don't care about the future, it seems to me that you do. For example, earlier you said,
"Science and logic work by looking at all your observed data and constructing a proposition for the future,"
and still earlier,
"I have a proposition, that things will continue as they are, and physics will more or less hold, with or without your god, in high probability, statistically."
It certainly seems you are no longer defending the obvious interpretation of the latter, so I'll leave it alone, but let's turn to the former. Are we constructing a model for the future with minimal assumptions? Then not to belabor, but one of the things we can't assume is that any of the regularities we've observed will continue. It's illegitimate, for example, to say, "The sun has risen every time, so our model will be that it will continue to rise until we see otherwise." That's a huge and arbitrary assumption being introduced into the model. There are, as I've pointed out (and you've already agreed) uncountable infinities of models of the universe's behavior in which the sun rises up to now and DOES NOT rise tomorrow. You say,
"At this point, I will have no choice but to propose that Chaos is the model, but proposing this prematurely then would violate the minimality principle."
But it seems that you're violating the minimality principle now by assuming NOT chaos. The most you could assume is that you don't know. And if you always choose the ordered model over the disordered one, for as long as you can, then you're back to having a well-defined but unjustifiable algorithm (and one which flagrantly violates the minimality principle).
Also, why do you always test the "ordered" model? Why not try turning the wheel the other way and testing one of the infinitely many other models that you should be considering? The fact is, santosh, you're NOT going to walk out in front of a bus to see what would happen, because you know all too well. (At least, I hope you're not. Don't do it, santosh!) You can't ignore this belief, but you also can't justify it by any minimality principle. It's not minimal in the least.
(Generic configurations, I should say, generally ARE disordered. If I predict what direction a ball will fly, I am choosing one out of infinitely many, one out of thousands, anyway, if you want to choose measurable granularity. It is always the assumption of order that is far less generic than the assumption of chaos, in a model).
Anyway, I hope I've been clear. I'm really interested in your answer, not just trying to be rhetorical.
@fulhamish, Thank you for the posts. Santosh is right in this case, though, I'm arguing for a little more than a cautionary point about probability. I'm suggesting that laws themselves could completely disappear, and take all our (useful) probabilistic analysis with them.
Or, not that they really could, but that if one does not believe in God, one has no source of knowledge to suggest in the least that they won't.
@spyman, There's a little more subtlety, but that'll do. ; )
In particular, I should probably make one thing clear that I've only hinted at before. I DO accept that the things we're doing -- science, probability, daily decisions, and the like -- are perfectly valid, but only because the Christian God actually DOES exist. It so happens that the atheist is wrong, and thus, so happens that his inconsistent assumptions continue to work again and again, thank God. But in using them, he's kind of relying on things that don't belong to his worldview.