Well, look at it this way. This isn't an antitrust suit against Oracle. It's an objection to a proposed business combination. You want to compare the degree by which this transaction would decrease the competitiveness of the market. If Oracle's actions are already running afoul of the antitrust laws, then the proper remedy is an antitrust suit. In the very limited context we have here, the inquiry has to be about how much worse things will get, not how bad they are.
Market value isn't what the HHI quantifies, but market share. This is vital in antitrust analysis because market share and market power are closely correlated. So the question is this: Will the absorption of Sun by Oracle substantially increase the concentration of the relevant market?
Where one firm has 100% of the market, it's easy to see the connection among market share, market power, and anticompetitive dangers. But even well below that level, antitrust regulators are concerned with business combinations that concentrate the market, for two reasons. First, a firm may be "merging to monopoly" in an attempt to acquire enough market share to exert illicit market power (with all the attendant disadvantages of monopoly). Second, a more concentrated market with fewer firms makes it easier for firms to coordinate, either because of actual cartels or simply because of oligopolistic pricing.
Now, like I said, the question isn't how bad it is now but how much worse it will get. If the change in HHI is very small, the danger of monopolization or some kind of anticompetitive coordination is minimal. These numbers are important indicia of antitrust danger because the numbers represent the types of behaviors with which antitrust law is concerned. When someone thinks an acquisition won't be good for the market, the numbers allow us to judge how bad it will be, if at all, in such a way that we can compare the effect with the amount we're willing to tolerate. I should point out that the amount we're willing to tolerate has to be considered together with the cost of investigation, the cost of stopping an acquisition, and the risk that the regulators are simply wrong (in other words, that they put a halt to a transaction that was actually procompetitive).