Hey guys,
Whew! Finally. Sorry about the delay. Unfortunately, I'm more busy, not less, so the delay for the next round of responses will probably be just as bad. (Sorry to keep doing this. The thing is, I really don't have time to have a highly active discussion and keep the quality up right now, and if I didn't explicitly say that I would not respond for several days, I'd feel impelled to).
OK, so, I'll start with you again, @dave:
I appreciated your response -- thanks! Very interesting points. The second one interests me somewhat more than the first, so let me know if my response to the first is inadequate as a result and I'll focus on it more.
Let's begin with point 1. You say not to confuse irrational beliefs with irrational actions. Fair enough. I would say that a rational action is one which one has good cause to believe will lead to a desired end. An irrational action would not be so tailored. You desire a third category -- arational. Certainly interesting, and possible, but before I get too deep into that discussion, I have to wonder why you brought this up. I don't recall mentioning actions as rational or irrational in my last post. I thought I was talking about beliefs -- right?
Perhaps it is because I have several times referred to the way people behave as indicative of their actual beliefs. This I think is perfectly fair. If somebody tells me (not that you did) that he does not believe one way or the other about the regularity of the future, but he always waits for the walk light to cross the street, I'm going to really wonder whether he's being completely honest about his intellectual beliefs.
Anyway, your next paragraph is more precise, so let's go there:
"It is not irrational to accept a belief is not rationally justifiable, but still act on it....My actions (which assume induction) aren’t irrational (as rationality doesn’t say anything about the issue), but a-rational (if that’s a word)."
Well, technically, I wouldn't entirely agree. Irrational behavior, to my way of thinking, is acting without a reason. Under your hypotheses, all behavior would have to be without reason, so all behavior would have to be, at least by this definition, irrational -- rational behavior would not even be theoretically possible, since there could be no tailoring of actions to ends.
Anyway, though, I think I only discuss behavior in the first place with reference to beliefs, as mentioned above. If somebody tells me he doesn't know one way or the other about the future, but nothing in the world will induce him to take one of my counter-regularity bets for $500, I do start to wonder why not. Of course, he may be able to explain. But if he can't explain, then he is acting without reason, and I would call that irrational.
2. Your first sentence is exceptionally interesting. I will probably respond to it for a long time. Here goes:
"You seem to argue that, because we need SOME assumption to get going, that ANY sets of assumptions are equally valid and should just be compared for their consequences."
This is quite close to a truth, but it's also very far from what I actually believe. I certainly _don't_ think any sets of assumptions are equally valid! But I do think they have to be analyzed for their consequences, and in particular for their self-consistency. Why is that? Simply because there is no other way to analyze them!
What could I possibly mean? Well, consider my basic assumptions or beliefs. One of them is that the Bible is the true Word of God. Now, if I try to argue with you, and I assume that in the argument, I'm going to be continually frustrated (as are you), because I will be quoting Scripture to you about how you're wrong and I'm right, but it will accomplish nothing, because you don't accept the validity of my premise.
Similarly, you hold the following premise as a basic belief:
"I argue we should minimize unnecessary assumptions, and just include the bare few ones that are needed."
Since I don't hold this as a basic belief (well, at least not the way you mean it! Though I might accept it in some form.), your attempt to settle this argument by appealing to it would be futile. For example, when you say
"You however make many other assumptions (that every single statement in the bible is true) whereas I make only a minimal few. So I win ;-),"
That is only valid under your assumptions. Appealing to your basic assumptions like this has no more validity to me than my quoting Scripture would have to you.
So what is to be done? The situation seems very like we might just have to throw up our hands and give up talking to each other, because each of us can make points only using his own assumptions, which the other does not accept.
But this is not the case. If the question is which basic set of assumptions to adopt, then of course, yes, I can't use one to defang the other. But I can ask, is this worldview consistent with itself? Because both claim to be logical. So if I can show that, in fact, your worldview destroys itself, or is self-inconsistent, _without assuming MY worldview_, then I have actually shown your set of assumptions to be flawed; while mine is not (unless you can show the same about it).
Does that make sense? So, the reason I think we have to adopt the assumptions of each worldview and analyze the consequences is because that very literally is the only logical possible way to compare them.
And what do I find if I assume your worldview? That there isn't a single belief you have that can't be destroyed _with your worldview_. You say we both must assume the validity of rationality. Well, we both need it, but my point is that as a bare assertion by itself, it is self-defeating. You assume rationality and what does it tell you? That you have no possible way of having confidence in your assumption of rationality!
Of course, I've focused on induction thus far, but I needn't have. Memory, the senses, personal identity, etc., are all subject to the same devastating critique on the bare assumption of rationality. And so, for that matter, is reason itself. There are immaterial logical rules that can always be relied on for truth? And our finite, evolved human brains have gained access to these, and the ability to know of their existence and reliability, through finitely many interactions in a physical world? Really? How does this possibly make sense to a materialist? (Not that you've said you're a materialist, and I don't know, but of course, most atheists are. But even if you're not, the problem only shifts itself slightly). (I think you actually alluded to this problem with the parenthesis at the end of your post).
In short, your assumptions are self-canibalizing. You assume that reason is reliable for finding truth, and it straightaway tells you that it's not. This is a woeful incoherency, and, I submit, an irreperable flaw in your world view. You say that we both must assume reason. I say, we both must assume the minimum necessary _to_ reason, and you have not.
So nothing at all is knowable on your assumptions. Does this make it false? Well, it certainly makes it irrational!
Now, you made an interesting point, and will doubtless make it more forcefully anon, so let me go ahead and respond to it now, especially since I won't be writing again for some days. You pointed out that I need reason myself to read/understand the Bible. After the passage above, you might well also point out that I need my eyes, memory, etc., and need to assume the reliability of all of them. Very true. But again, on my assumptions, that reliability makes sense. If I once decide to trust the revelation of God in the Bible, then I see how my eyes are trustworthy, and why I was able to rely on them even before I had heard of God, or in His grace He had revealed to me the reason. So, certainly I am not saying I _don't_ need sight, and reason, and induction, and all the rest. Merely I am saying that I can make sense of why I rely on them. My basic beliefs do not cannibalize either each other or themselves.
And in this way we see -- without introducing arbitrary assertions such as "less is more" or the like -- that your worldview is actually irrational.
I hope I have now better clarified my cart-before-the-horse claim from before. The point is that if one only assumes bare logic, induction, and the like, you can use them to smash each other, so the result is one doesn't have logic, induction, etc. left. Whereas if one assumes Christian theism, well, then you have all the logic, induction, memory, and reason you want, but you're already at God from the start. (Not to say, of course, that there isn't plenty of evidence for Him once you look for it inside this world view).
In short, then, I think you make, not a minimal few assumptions, but a less-than-minimal few, which is your problem. :-) The suggestion that the human mind is useful for reaching truth about the world, through either reason or generalization, is not a weak one. It is actually a dazzlingly strong claim, both about the mind and about the world, and your worldview is hopelessly inadequate to give it even the travesty of a support.
I hope I have responded to your points, but please let me know. I'm sure you will. :-)
@santosh,
Ack! You did not respond to my request for clarification. I fear I have already responded to the points you make here. There is little point in both of our just responding the same exact words back and forth to each other. Please answer the questions I asked, and address your points to the arguments I made. I already know what you are claiming. I have said why I think it is wrong. Now don't just tell me THAT I am wrong. Tell me why.
@dexter,
Yowzers! This is a ton to respond to! So, first of all, thank you for your voluminous responses, and second, sorry about the fact that I'm almost guaranteed to forget to respond to some of it. I'll do my best.
First off the bat -- apology accepted re: the two mutually recognized straw men. I'm sure we've all gotten confused in a long internet discussion. Sorry for being snarky -- you can perhaps understand my frustration as well.
OK, so on to your former point #3, which you continue to maintain was valid.
The argument you are accusing me of making (in your original point #3) is this: "My intuition says God exists, and reality looks like I would expect it to if He does, so He does." This bears no resemblance to any argument I have made. My argument is and has been that knowledge of various forms, and reason itself, would be impossible if God did not exist.
Moving on to the quotes you take from me -- the Page 3 quote simply does not say that I am asking for groundless faith, or that evidence is not necessary, or anything like that. Read it again. I'm sorry, it doesn't. It is criticizing the addressee (I have no idea who anymore) for inconsistent rational standards.
The page 4 quote -- when I said "revealed Himself," I was not referring to any subjective in-my-head experience, and I'm not sure why you would think I was. Anyway, I was referring to the Bible, as well as to the Incarnation.
Ditto with the second page-4 quote.
Page 5 quote, you ask, "And what are these beliefs based on?" They are based on the revealed Word of God in the Bible. They are supported by reason in various ways -- the one I am referring to at present is that reason would be impossible without them.
On the page 6 quote, you say:
"So... you *do* accept physical evidence... but you are selective about it and only accept those pieces of evidence that support your pre-existing view. From what stance do you choose to accept certain evidence but not other evidence? Your feelings?"
Dexter, please: I don't want to have to say this again. I have NEVER said I do not accept physical evidence. I accept ALL physical evidence, and believe in its validity. This is the THIRD time you have accused me of saying otherwise, and the third time I have corrected you. I will have to take further repetitions of this by you as deliberate twisting of my words.
My point has never been that I don't accept physical evidence. It has been that YOU should not, given your beliefs, and that this inability of your beliefs to support the rationality of accepting physical evidence is a flaw.
On page 7: "I read that as, more or less, "my invented model for the world does not contradict itself, therefore it is true" i.e. Reification fallacy... because you think something you take it as real."
Um, that's not what the reification fallacy means, first of all. Second of all, yes, if one is comparing two beliefs and one of them is self-contradictory and the other is not, then the latter has an immediate advantage. A more interesting critique would be, "Well, how do you know there aren't others that are self-consistent?" That will have to be for another day, though for now I'll just say, as I did to abge, that it's not a discussion I feel the least impelled to have while you're still sitting in your admittedly inconsistent worldview. (Not that you have admitted that, but if you accepted the first premise of the argument, then you would have).
Look, it really feels like you have a handy wall guide to fallacies, and you're putting a lot of effort into putting all my arguments into one of those boxes. The problem is, you're doing it so fast, you're completely missing what my arguments actually are. Please just respond to the substance, and don't constantly (mis)label. This had nothing to do with a reification fallacy.
You go on to mischaracterize two more of my quotations as based on feelings, when I said nothing about feelings. I'm not going to respond individually to those. But honestly, you can't just read things into what I said ("Sounds like feelings to me") and then criticize me for it, lol. If I didn't say feelings, you're going to have to make do with a rebuttal that doesn't depend on my having said feelings.
And I didn't say them, or anything like them. This is all desperate reading in.
The argument I'm actually making is subtle, interesting, and hard enough, without my having to respond to critiques aimed at completely different arguments that I never made at all, and never would make. :-P
OK, that is the end of my response to your first post. (I'm putting in bookmarkers like this to try to increase clarity).
Third post: Yes, I do place faith in the Bible. Your original point 6, however, was not just about placing faith in the Bible. It was about doing so because the Bible contains spectacular accounts, or because my prayers have been answered. These are not the reasons I believe in the Bible. You can't just equate all arguments that rely on the Bible and say that if I made one, I made them all. Arguments are logically distinct.
In this particular case, my argument is that the Bible is the only ground for reason.
As for the many logical problems you point to with the Bible -- thank you for your speculation that I don't care to mix reason and theology. It happens to be false. I can't very well answer vague and undirected claims of problems, though. Feel free to post specifics if you wish, although I am not going to turn this thread (or my part in it, anyway) turned into an unending witch hunt for Biblical problems. You can post one or two, but there are plenty of resources on such things, and it is an aside to my main argument.
End of third post, beginning of fourth post.
"To say that we have absolutely no reason to assume order then therefore that disorder is probable is nonsense. In order to make such a statement you (and the probability theory you mention) have to assume probability itself as a valid concept... which would be itself assuming rationality."
Well, again, I am happy to assume such things, in order to show that they destroy themselves in your worldview. That's my point.
"Further, the assignation of equal probability to every imaginable world is arbitrary"
Well not really -- you could say so, I guess, but it's the principle of insufficient reason. The point is that if you don't have any reason to prefer one of the options, you should view them all as equal or you're sneaking in an assumption.
Once again, remember the context of this discussion: YOU are assuming induction/order. I only have to show that YOU are making unwarranted assumptions in so doing. That is and has always remained true. If my calculation is flawed (say you) because I am assuming all the probabilities are equal, what does that say about your calculation, which assumes that one of the probabilities is one?
"You have no basis to make such an assumption. "
False, as noted.
"And... simply because you can imagine something does not give it likelihood."
OK, but that goes for order, too.
"The only world that we can currently have any knowledge of its likelihood is the one that exists... we know it is possible and you cannot refute the possibility that it is inevitable"
Yes, but we don't know whether the one that exists is ordered after today, or not.
And yes, there is the possibility that it is inevitable, and the possibility that it is not. Why don't you tell me why you feel free assuming one of those?
"I see a rational universe... which is consistent with it being either God-run or inevitable... I don't see a god (and I do see quite a bit suggesting no god), therefore I figure it (the universe) must have been inevitable. "
Fine, fine, but you continue to completely ignore the main point, which is that you have no way of knowing, without just assuming, that the world will continue to be rational.
Onto the fifth post:
"In regards to your response to #7 - I think maybe you missed my main point. My point was that each of these alternate beliefs (alternate to typical Christian belief) were each "possible" given what we know of god (i.e. nothing). And for you to argue that my belief (bb2b)"
Ah, OK. Well then I would just reaffirm that I hold only to Christian theism, so the other theistic possibilities -- yes, those are self-refuting, like atheism. And the atheistic possibilities are, as well, since none fo them gives us access to knowledge.
Incidentally, you continue to miss a subtle point that is fundamental to everything I'm saying: I'm not just talking about whether the universe is regular. I'm talking about our ability to know whether it's regular. In that distinction lies everything.
I didn't really follow this post very well, to be honest. But I think you're saying that whatever I'm doing to your world view, you could do to mine. That is false. My assumptions to not lead to their own refutation. Yours do.
Again: the possible knowledge sources in your world are whatever evolution put into our brain because it was adaptive over the course of the generations when it was being selected for. Nothing in that process correlates with the future of the world, a priori, and nothing about it enables you to make infallible -- or even probable -- assumptions about said future out of thin air, so you are left with no knowledge at all about the future of the world.
I am not.
Nor am I left without knowledge as to how I came to my knowledge of God.
On to the sixth post. Once again a disclaimer here -- I of course don't think that the attractiveness of either worldview is really on-point with respect to its truth, but I'm happy to discuss it as a side issue.
You seem to me to be very inconsistent here. You blame Christians for finding the universe _without God_ dark, but you yourself admit you would find the universe _with_ God dark. Why do Christians get judged on the basis of the worldview they don't believe in, but you get judged on the basis of the one you do?
What I mean is, you believe that the world, without God, is a beautiful place. And Christians believe that the world, with God, is a beautiful and happy place. So BOTH of them actually believe that the world, AS IT IS, is a beautiful place. Why does that make them (us) pessimists, but you an optimist? That seems terribly unfair.
"I don't see the world that way - and I don't need to inject god into it to explain it. "
Well, logically you do, but don't feel obliged to be logical I suppose.
On to a little theology!
"Similarly, many Christians (not you necessarily - though I invite a response) feel that people are essentially bad and that they would do bad things all the time if they could get away with it (and didn't have God looking over their shoulder) and didn't have commandments against bad behavior."
Well, I do think that people are fallen, so they are "essentially bad" in the sense that they are rebels against God who sin a great deal, who love sin, and who resist giving up sin. Moreover, many of their motives are sinful even for apparently OK actions.
That said, do I think people "would do bad things all the time if ... God weren't looking over their shoulder"? Well, no. If I believed that, I would have to think that atheists never do good things, since atheists don't believe God IS looking over their shoulder. But plenty of atheists do very good things.
"Indeed, many Christians feel that moral behavior is actual reducible simply to behavior that is in line with God's will - period. i.e. it is completely morally relative. I see this as an evil, actually. "
OK, well, you might be able to guess how seriously I am going to take a lecture on moral relativism from an atheist who admits five sentences on that his own morality is relative.
God is the only possible grounding for _absolute_ morality. It is relative to God, of course, but God is absolute and necessary.
"I admit that morality in my world view is not absolute either... but I do see it as logical and in my self-interest and the interests of those I love to endeavor to be moral... my view does not change when no one is looking - even without an all-seeing god. "
OK. My view doesn't change when noone is looking either.
Of course, you just said that your own morality was based on your self-interest. Presumably, there might be times when your self-interest in being IMmoral could be so overwhelming that it would override the interests of morality?
"1) I observe the universe to be rational. "
OK. But you don't observe it to be rational _tomorrow_. Yet.
"4) While I can concede that I'm somewhat agnostic about the beginnings of the universe, I understand from physicists such as Stephen Hawking that the big bang did not require any god - that the physics/math/probabilities were sufficient by themselves. I figure they probably know what they are talking about (and at least have an "epistemologically" consistent view on the matter, if that's the right word [it's not a word I'm used to using])."
Ah! Here you and I differ. I find their arguments to be utter rubbish.
5) I didn't make any prime mover argument, here or anywhere, so I am not responding to this. And your other points also aren't really on-point to any of my arguments, which is why I didn't respond to them. (Even if I don't agree with everything you say, it would take us very far afield).
You still haven't explained how you can have access to such a truth as "the universe is rational," though (in the future, not just in what you've observed).
Seventh post:
Yes, you're quite right, Last Thursdayism is a problem for you. You can't really give any good argument for why it's false, on your assumptions.
I confess I am getting decidedly pessimistic as to whether you will ever engage my actual argument, or even acknowledge that, in assuming the regularity of the future, you are making a bare assumption, one which the past cannot, by itself, possibly support in any way.
But I'll try once more, with an illustration I used earlier.
Suppose I tell you I'm going to write down a bunch of numbers -- 100 -- and the first 10 I write down are
1 4 9 16 25 36 49 64 81 100.
Do you see that there is no rational argument for why the next one will be 121? That you have to _assume_ that I'm going to keep being regular?
OK, on to Stenger. Both sides in this debate have people who rarely make anything but bad arguments, or at least, who make so many bad arguments that it is hardly worthwhile to sift through for their good arguments. Victor Stenger is one of those on your side.
Here is the problem with this particular article. He makes his whole article irrelevant where he says, "Of course, that requires providing a physical definition of nothing." The problem is, when people ask, "Why is there something rather than nothing?" they mean nothing in a philosophical sense, NOT A PHYSICAL VACUUM. If you have a vacuum, then you already have a universe with physical laws. That's not nothing! And all of Stenger's analysis proceeds on the assumption that that is the nothing you have. So, I fear, it is completely uninteresting. It gets you to an inevitable universe only if you already assume all the laws of physics exist as necessary. But that's probably why you were asking the question in the first place. Getting from "all the laws of physics and a space for them to work in" to "everything today" is a lot different than getting from "nothing" to "everything today."
Of course, this is an interesting question even for a theist -- why is there a God? So I'm not saying it's not a good question. Just that Stenger's analysis of it, as of most things, is useless.
I also looked at the other article you linked, but that, too, is addressing something completely different. The question that is addressing is: if there are going to be physical laws, and in fact, if there are going to be OUR physical laws, what is the probability that the physical constants should be what they are?
All very interesting, but it already starts as a position of assuming there are going to be physical laws, so it has absolutely nothing to say to any of the arguments I have been making.
I hope that your new responses will be more on point to the arguments that I have actually made, and not to those that I haven't. ; ) Specifically, not whether you claim to know something, but how you possibly could. And the number example above, and induction. For a start.
Thank you again, though for your response.
@orathaic,
"Chaos" was a word in English long before it was a word in math or physics, so I will not make the least apology for how I used it.
I agree that chaos (in the physical/mathematical sense) is very beautiful, and can help increase one's appreciation for nature.
You're quite right that there are other forms of theism, which would not support reason or knowledge. I am not arguing for bare theism, but for Christian theism, which eliminates the possibilities you refer to.
As for a materialist's beliefs being a best estimate -- my point of course is that he has no reason to believe they are even that, or indeed a good approximation in any way.
Whew! It seems to be near 7 AM and I have yet to get to bed. As I say, busy week. :-) Take care. I look forward to reading such responses as you all may send, and I will reply when time allows (not before the weekend).